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Abstraet 
In this work we develop an ana!ytical framework to examine the effeets of strategie investments on the fmaneia! 
poliey of the firmo From the resouree-based approaeh of the firm, non-tradeable and diffieult-to-eopy assets are the 
basis of a sustainable eompetitive advantage. However, imperfeetions in the resouree markets ean also be 
interpreted as sourees of eosts and/or restrictions from a fmancia! point of view. Specifieity and opacity are the 
features of strategic resourees that enable us to identify the fmancia! implieations of the resouree-based strategy. 
We have tested our theoretieal framework using a sample of Spanish non-fmancial firms. Our results show that 
highly specifie and opaque resourees limit the borrowing eapacity of the firm while other transparent strategic 
assets positive1y affeet fmancia! leverage. Our fmdings suggest two main implieations for strategy formulation and 
implementation: (1) there are unobservable -fmancial- eosts that must be eonsidered for a eorreet evaluation of a 
sustainable eompetitive advantage based on strategic resourees and (2) the fmaneia! poliey of a "resource-driven" 
firm is partia!ly detennined by the features of its strategic resource bundle. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The resource-based view of the finn has been one of the most productive approaches for identifying 
the sources of a sustainable competitive advantage (Bamey, 1986; Peteraf, 1993; Prahalad and Hamel, 
1990; Wemerfelt, 1988). Under this perspective, non-imitable and difficult-to-copy assets and 
capabilities enhance the sustainability and appropriability of above-nonnal retums. 
However, this optimistic view of 'resource-driven strategies' ofien ignores the cost of developing and 
implementing strategic resources and capabilities (Montgomery, 1995). Uncertainty, specificity and 
long run tenns of maturation are features of strategic resources which impose unavoidab1e --and ofien 
unobservable-- costs and restrictions that should be considered for a correct evaluation of future 
resource rents. Actually, many of those assets characteristics that add value to the finn are, essentially, 
the same ones that limit its imitation or substitution by competitors. 
The relevance of the financia1 aspects of resource-based strategies lies in two main issues regarding 
research in management sciences. First, imperfections in factor markets justify the link between the 
financial policy of the firm and its investments in strategic resources. Notwithstanding the differences 
between finance and strategic research, both approaches had reciprocally benefit from a closer look to 
market imperfections as a relevant context. This common concern has allowed a better understanding 
of the links between finance and strategy research. Actually, market imperfections are the core of the 
economic interpretation of strategic research as they are primary sources of heterogeneity in the firm's 
behavior and performance. But sorne of these market failures are also considered potential 
explanations ab1e to contribute to complete a theory of the capital structure. In light of this, the 
examination of the financia1 implications of different organizational economic approaches such as 
agency theory and transaction cost economics (Kochhar, 1996) or the role of capital structure in 
assuring efficient govemance structures (Hitt and Smart, 1994; Jensen, 1986; Williamson, 1988) have 
became frequent financial references within the conversation of strategic management. 
Second, financial measures of corporate performance might be misinterpreted when firm assets are 
specific, idiosyncratic, co-specialized and imperfectiy transferable. In this scenario, traditional 
measures computed from financial statements --ROE, ROA-- or market-based infonnation --Tobin's q, 
market to book equity ratio-- are misleading because the asset pricing model on which they are based, 
does not apply (Robins, 1992). As Winter (1995) points out, financial measures can lose their 
meaning when markets are imperfect and this is precise1y in the context of the resource-based view of 
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the firmo The conclusion is a 'valuation paradox' of the resource-based paradigm which can be stated 
in the following terms: imperfections in resource markets are the source rents but the value of such 
rents are imperfectly measurable when markets are imperfecto 
Therefore, should we refuse the resource-based approach for analyzing the value of a competitive 
advantage? The answer, fortunately, is no. Imperfect markets do not exclude the possibility of asset 
evaluation. The problem arising from market imperfections is that asset price can be undetermined 
--multiple or no price can exist for every asset--, while the 'Arrow-Debreu scenario' of perfect, 
transpar~nt and competitive markets assures the existence and unicity of price for any asset. Moreover, 
even if a feasible price for the finn's assets does not exist, market imperfections can be associated to 
observable effects of the firm's behavior, namely, its financial policy. This perspective is particularly 
useful for examining the value of competitive advantage in terms of financial risk and unobservable 
financial restrictions and constitutes the basis of our conceptual framework. 
As Modigliani and Miller (1963; !958) stated, perfect and transparent markets are sufficent conditions 
to assure the separation of investment and financial decisions. On the contrary, investment and 
financing activities might be interliriked when markets show sorne kinds of imperfections. This starting 
point suggests a clear relationship between the 'resource-driven strategy' of the firm and its financial 
policy. In other terms, the financial strategy of the firm can partially reveal the type of market 
imperfection which sustains a given 'resource-based' competitive advantage. 
To the extent that we identify the 'strategic content' of an asset with severa! market imperfections --
non-tradeable, specific and/or complementary productive factors-- we can conclude that sorne kinds of 
imperfections in resource markets can affect the financial po!icy of the firmo Our purpose in this paper 
is to analyze the interactions between the features of resources and capabilities that guarantee their 
value and the financial policy of the firmo We develop a theoretical framework founded on the recent 
research in corporate finance and strategy to explore the financial effects of a 'resource-driven 
strategy'. Finally, we test the resulting propositions using a sample of Spanish firms. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next two sections describe the specifi.c and 
opaque dimension of the firm's resources as sources of value and explore the financia! implications of 
specific and opaque resources. Then we examine the degree of intema!ization of strategic resources 
accumulation as an indirect but observable measure of ~pecific and opaque assets. The characterization 
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of our sample and methodology corresponds to the next section. Final1y, the two last sections present 
and discuss our results, respectively. 
CREATING VALUE THROUGH STRATEGIC INVESTMENTS: SPECIFIC AND OPAQUE 
RESOURCES 
Researchers in strategy have devoted much time and effort to defining and describing the features of 
assets capable of generatingsustainable rents. Unique assets are the source of searcity --or ricardian--
rents1 (Mahoney and Pandian, 1992; Peteraf, 1993). But uniqueness is not a sufficient condition for a 
resource to be valuable --i.e. source of rents--. Scarce resources have higher productivity but also 
higher costs --competitive prices-- than non-scarce ones. Actual1y, given a fixed supply of certain 
productive inputs, perfect markets assure the inexistence of extraordinary profits to the extent that 'ex-
ante' competition for acquiring such scarce resources might jeopardize potential resource rents. Thus, 
the resource ability to sustain above-normal profits --its strategic content-- should arise from other 
concurrent features of resources different from their scarcity2. 
In other cases, the assets considered as individual items do not justify their value inside the firmo 
Specific assets generate quasi-rents (Klein, Crawford and Alchian, 1978). Complementary and co-
specialized assets enhance the value of the firm as a whole (Teece, 1986). Sometimes, the key to a 
sustainable competitive advantage is not a single resource but the way assets work together. Actually, 
this is the meaning of 'capability', defined as the efficient combination of resources to perform a given 
task (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990). 
Despite the great number of definitions and c1assifications of resources and capabilities, we wil1 focus 
on two main characteristics which are commonly regarded as defining strategic assets: specificity and 
opacity. This choice is not arbitrary. For the purpose of this work, most of the seemingly different 
concepts can be cathegorized into these two basic dimensions. 
I We use 'scarce' to refer to resources with fixed or quasi-fixed supply (Peteraf, 1993). 
2 Ricardian rents resulting from a scarce resource are appropriated by their owner only if such resource 
became scarce after acquiring it. Thus, the ultimate source of extraordinary profits is the capacity to 
identify future scarce resources and exploit the resulting 'first mover' advantage. 
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The specific dimension of strategic resources 
Firm-specific assets have been broadly recognised as a clear example of the straightforward connection 
between resources and competitive advantage. Specific resources are, in essence, source of 'quasi-
rents' when the shadow price of an asset is substantially higher than its market price or the opportunity 
cost for its owner (Klein, Crawford, and Alchian, 1978). Although most of the references available in 
the literature interpret 'specificity' as 'firm-specificity', the former term admits an extended meaning. 
Actually, specificity can be considered a 'relational' concept. An asset is not specific by itself but in 
relation to 'something'. There may be 'firm-specific' or 'activity-specific' resources depending on 
whether their deployment inside a particular firm or applied to a distinctive activity, respectively, yield 
'quasi-rents3,. Therefore, 'firm-specific' or 'activity-specific' assets are valuable as long as the finn 
survives, or as far as the activity is feasible, respectively. Otherwise, 'quasi-rents' dissipate and the 
asset loses its value. Thus, we can conclude that specificity is a characteristic of resources which 
enhances the value of the firm4. In light of this it is easy to find clear similarities between an extended 
definition of 'specific assets' and other strategic features which reflect gains of value when two 01' 
more assets are exploited together. Defining specificity as 'the loss of value of a firm asset when it is 
used by outsiders', we can consider 'complementary' 01' 'co-specialized' assets as synonymous with 
'specific' assets to the extent that the former concepts reflect gains ofvalue when assets are owned and 
deployed by a single and distinctive decision unit. This wider interpretation of specificity is particularly 
useful for achieving a deeper understanding of sorne ofthe financial implications ofthe resource-based 
strategy. 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
Acquisition of highly specific and profitable assets requires a continuous stream of specific investment 
to achieve the 'critical mass' of a given strategic resource. In addition, these investments have a 
'maturation period' or the interval ranging from the time in which the effective investment was made, 
3 An investment can be considered specific when there is a significant difference between its current 
use and its 'second best' use (Klein, Crawford and Alchian, 1978). Such definition would correspond 
to the 'Activity-specific' concepto A slightly different term is 'firm-specificity', which reflects 
differences in the value of a given resource when used by different firms, even if exploited in similar 
activities. Both definitions are equivalent as long as it is assumed that the use of an 'activity-specific' 
asset inside a particular firm is imperfectiy replicable by others. 
4 Specificity is not a sufficient condition to guarantee 'above-normal' retums. Ifthe resource is owned 
by a firm with no bargaining power at all, the whole amount of'quasi-rents' wíll be appropriated by 
the other contracting party (worker, supplier, 01' partner firm). Therefore, we are assuming that the firm 
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until the strategic resource produces rents (Dierickx and Cool, 1989). During that period, the firm is 
exposed to higher financial risk compared to other firms with less specific investment projects. We can 
imagine a firm facing two hypothetical investment programs with different degrees of specificity with 
two possible outcomes depending on the success 01' failure of the investment program --figure 1--. In 
financial terms, the more specific the asset, the higher the spread between the possible outcomes and, 
consequentIy, the financial risk of the firm will be increased. A direct comparison between the 
programs outcome in case 01success may lead to an overvaluation of high-specific assets which could 
support unrealistic conclusions about the 'strategic' content --i.e. sustainable long-term value-- of such 
assets. Actually, both investment programs in our example have equal expected values when success 
and failure are equally probable because the lower expected profit in case of success for the low-
specific program is balanced by the lower loss when failure occurs. 
The opaque dimension of strategic resources 
The uniqueness of an asset bundle can be due to supply restrictions --for example, a particular location 
01' innate human skills-- but also can arise from the absence of information to outsiders willing to 
exploit it to achieve their purposes. This is what we define as opacity. In more precise terms, an opaque 
asset is one that, due to its nature or to the firm's actions, eludes its imitation by impeding the leakage 
01any related inlormation to outsiders. This related information might range from the expected value 
of exploitation of a given resource to the way of acquiring, accumulating 01' deploying a certain 
resource 01' capability. In this context, the competitive advantage of a 'resource-driven' firm is not 
based on specific 01' complementary resources but is the result of a 'transfer-barrier' which precludes 
strategic assets from imitation 01' substitution. The nature of these barriers can be institutional as in the 
case of patents and licenses. Nevertheless, the strategic content of certain 'knowledge-assets' (Winter, 
1987) can be threatened ifthey are easy to identify, transparent, and have well-defined property rights, 
so they can be transferred in a competitive market. 
As shown in figure 2, resources easy to identify, transparent and with well-defined property rights have 
limited ability to sustain a durable competitive advantage. Therefore, when a privileged competitive 
position of a firm is based on a given asset 01' resource bundle, we can conclude that any --01' several--
ofthe aboye features do not apply for a given 'strategic' resource. 
is the owner ofthe asset 01' has, to sorne extent, enough bargaining power to appropriate a signiticant 
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INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
It could happen that the resources are easy to identify but not transparent. Clear examples of such 
resources are trade secrets and data banks. These kinds of items are clearly defined and they can be 
valuable resources for competitors --thus, not specific--. and, due to their nature, they are hardly 
protectable once they have been disclosed5. In such cases, an obvious way to preserve the value of 
such 'knowledge assets' is to keep them away from competitors' sight. Actually, secrecy can be 
considered as an artificial opacity to the extent that the film attempts to prevent undesired leakage of 
information about the key --strategic resources-- to its competitive advantage. In other words, artificial 
opacity arise when the firm knows clearly what its strategic reource bundle is and how it works, and, 
consequently, is able to replicate and transfer it to other organizations. The rent-eaming potential of 
such 'resource-driven' firms results from the firm's deliberate effort to achieve and maintain the 
scarcity of its resource bundle. Evidently, the competitive advantage based on easy-to-identify but 
secret assets will be durable depending on two forces: (l) the effectiveness of the procedures assuring 
the secrecy and, (2) the willingness of competitors to acquire the critical information. 
But opacity can arise from phenomena difficult to understand even for the firm, unable to identify the 
devices and resources that sustain its competitive position. The complexity of interaction among 
existing assets and the 'tacit knowledge' embedded in human resources create a situation of 'causal 
ambiguity' and 'uncertain imitability' (Lippman and Rumelt, 1982) which preserves the key of a 
competitive advantage from imitation because current and potential competitors cannot identify the 
sources of the competitive advantage and, hence, they are not able to erode it. Clear examples of such 
opaque resources are those arising from 'social complexitiy' and human resources deployment and 
configuration: networks, relationships, culture and values, 'social capital'. In the same vein, random 
and chaotic processes are ofien behind valuable resources and strategic capabilities such as search, 
adaptation and implementation of new ideas and procedures. These activities can only be partially 
controlled and imperfectlypredicted by the firm's manager (Thiétart and Forgues, 1995; Koput, 1997). 
In our terms, this absence of systematic procedures for acquiring or substituting sorne of the strategic 
resources derives into a situation of natural opacity. Whatever the source and features of the opacity 
portion of the 'quasi-rents'. 
5 This fact is a major difference between the knowledge protection provided by patents and trade 
secrets. Patents are voluntary disclosure of knowledge in order to prevent the use of such knowledge 
without permission of its owner. Therefore, competitors cannot exploit the patented item, even though 
they had developed it by their own means. Conversely, other strategic resources (such as trade secrets 
and data banks) cannot be defended ifthe protected knowledge has been legally acquired by others. 
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are, the limited information about the strategic resource bundle will affect positively the appropriation 
of rents by the firm as it eliminates the 'extemalities' of information as an strategic asset6• 
Unfortunately, this situation may also narrow the spectrum of financial possitilities when funds 
suppliers cannot observe any credible signal about the future use and outcomes of their investment. 
THE RESOURCE-BASED STRATEGY AND THE FINANCIAL POLICY OF THE FIRM 
So far we have examined how specific and opaque resources can be a source of aboye-normal retums. 
The firm's competitive advantage based on specific resources will be sustainable as long as the firm 
continues the activities in which these resources are valuable. Unfortunately, markets and technologies 
ofien evolve in unpredictable ways. This uncertainty makes specific investments riskier and, hence, 
more expensive to finance. The other strategic dimension of strategic resources, opacity, is an obvious 
barrier to imitation but also contributes to limiting the available funds when financial investors do not 
have access to the critical information of the future use of their funds. Therefore, the financial approach 
to imperfect markets provides a dual perspective partially ignored by strategy researchers. 
lmperfections in resource markets can be seen as source of sustainable eamings and long-term 
restrictions. Obviously, both must be taken into account to achieve an accurate evaluation of a firm's 
competitive advantage (Bamey, 1986). 
Financial implications of specific investments 
Assets characteristics play an important role in the theory of capital structure because the costs of both 
financial distress and liquidation depend on the nature of a firm's assets. In case of financial distress, 
firm-specific assets will suffer large losses of value when the corporation is reorganized or liquidated. 
Thus, there is a direct relationship between the specific dimension of a firm's assets and "Íts financial 
risk. Moreover, theory suggests that equity financing is optimal for assets whose value is sensitive to 
the financial condition of the firm (Myers. 1977; Williamson, 1988). 
These results have two main implications in the strategic research field. First, traditional accounting 
measures of profitability ~-ROA, ROE-- do not discount the risk premium due to specific assets and, 
hence, are not accurate measures of resource rents (Montgomery and Wemerfelt, 1988). Second, from 
a financial perspective, highly specific assets have a limited capacity to insure lenders against 
6 Information-based resources such as those resulting from R&D activities, have spillover effects as 
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bankruptcy. When facing firms with specific assets, debt holders wil1 react by charging a risk premium 
to debt cost enforcing an inverse relationship between specific resources and financialleverage7• This 
conclusion can be summarized in the fol1owing proposition: 
PI: The degree of asset specificity is negatively related to the financialleverage of the firmo 
Examining the relation between asset characteristics and capital structures is, however, complicated by 
the fact that a firm's vulnerability to financial distress costs is unobservable. Researchers have dealt 
with this problem by using accounting variables such as fixed-to-total assets (Friend and Lang, 1988), 
R&D and advertising expenses (Bradley, Jarrell and Kim, 1984; Kale, Noe, and Ramírez, 1991; Opler 
and Titman, 1994), and the market-to-book assets ratio (Smith and Watts, 1992; Barclay and Smith, 
1995a, 1995b) to proxy the value of growth options, which are assumed to have a high degree of 
exposure to the costs of both financial distress and liquidation --for a survey, see Harris and Raviv, 
(1991)--. Fixed assets are used in empirical corporate finance studies to proxy assets-in-place. Firms 
with high fixed assets are presumed by most financial researchers to have relatively few growth options 
and hence low liquidation costs. Intangible assets proxy for growth options of firm-specific assets and, 
thus, are presumed to have high liquidation costs. Advertising and R&D expenditures are believed to 
create growth options and/or firm-specific assets. High expenditures on these items are therefore 
associated with high liquidation costs. 
Strategy literature generally agrees with the interpretation of intangible investments as valid proxies for 
'firm-specific' resources, but its perspective is slightly different. Whilst corporate finance researchers 
interpret these investments as revealing higher costs --of liquidation--, strategy researchers tend to see 
investments in R&D, advertising and human resources practices as observable measures for the stock 
of strategic resources such as innovative capabilities, corporate reputation and human capital. Al1 those 
resources and capabilities fulfil1 the conditions to be 'strategic' as they (i) are valuable --
specific,opaque-- and (ii) have imperfect markets --if any--. Under such an 'optimistic bias', the 
positive and robust link between the aboye variables and accounting measures of performance is ofien 
viewed as an evidence of the higher rent-eaming potential of the approximated strategic resources 
they produce positive extemalities over other firm's knowledge stock (Griliches, 1991). 
7 These phenomena lead to an increase in the average cost of the firm's funds if we assume that debt 
financing is cheaper than equity financing. Tax effects (Modigliani and Miller, 1963) and agency costs 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976) are potential explanations for higher costs of equity financing. 
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ignoring that such relationship may reflect a risk premium or higher shadow prices of investment due 
to financial restrictions. 
Financial implications of opaque investments 
One of the most productive areas of corporate finance research has dealt with asyrnmetries of 
information between firms and investors attempting to provide explanation to ti wide range of 
phenomena: financial structure, ownership structure, mergers and acquisitions among others (Harris 
and Raviv, 1991). 
In these theories, firm managers or insiders are assumed to possess private information about the 
characteristics of the firm's return stream or investment opportunities. In such situation, capital 
structure is designed to mitigate inefficiencies in the firm's investment decisions that are caused by the 
information asymmetry (Myers and Majluf, 1984; Myers, 1984). If firms are required to finance new 
projects by issuing equity, underpricing may be so severe that new investors capture more than the net 
preset value of the new project, resulting in a net loss to existing shareholders. In this case the project 
will be rejected even if its net present value is positive. Ihis underinvestment can be avoided if the 
firm can finance the new project using a security that is not so severely undervalued by the market8. 
For example, internal funds and/or riskless debt involve no undervaluation, and, therefore, will be 
preferred to equity by firms in this situation. Myers (1984) refers to this as a 'pecking order' theory of 
financing, i.e., that capital structure will be driven by firm's desire to finance new investments, first 
internally, then with low-risk debt, and finally with equity only as a last resort. 
As we have previously stated, non-specific and identifiable resources can be protected from imitation 
by obscuring any actitivity which could reveal critical information to outsiders --f.e. by means of 
integration--. Unfortunately, this behavior could affect negatively the access to external funds and, in 
the most extreme cases, the project should be financed only by internally generated funds as the access 
to low risk debt is limited when specific assets are a substantial proportion of a firm's resources9. Ihus, 
we can conclude that, 
8 Ihe underinvestment phenomenum derived from informational asymmetries is a clear example of the 
dual perspective of financial and strategy research. Suboptimal investment is characterized by a 
positive difference between the marginal productivity of capital and its financial cost, which can be 
interpreted as above-normal rents when the 'shadow' cost due to financial restriction is not considered. 
9 Several phenomena can reinforce the financial restrictions derived from the existing information 
asymmetries, Le. the firm's restrictions for issuing low-risk debt --young or small size firms and 
projects indivisibility--. . 
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P2: the degree of opacity (transparency) offirm's resources restricts (enhances) the access to 
external financing ofthe firm and, particularly, to debt financing. 
IfP1 and P2 are verified, investments in specific and opaque resources will be negatively related to the 
firm's debt ratio because of the higher cost of debt if the firm owns specific and riskier assets, and due 
to restrictions in borrowing capacity given the existing information asymmetry associated with the 
exploitation of opaque resources --figure 3--. Furthermore, this bidimensional approach is consistent 
with sorne previous evidence of positive effects of specific but transparent investments on financial 
leverage (Balakrishnan and Fox, 1993). 
INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE 
Once propositions PI and P2 are formulated there are no clear methods to measure the specific and 
opaque degree of a firm's resources. This situation is complicated by the fact that as a resource-view 
scheme states, firms are configured by unique resource bundles and a given resource may be specific to 
one firm but not to others. Moreover, as Williamson (1988) declares '... the tangible/intangible 
breakdown is a very incomplete measure o/asset specificity. Thus, although intangible investments in 
R&D and advertising have poor redeployability, this is true o/ many tangible assets'. Actual!y, both 
features --specificity and opacity-- are unobservable and, thus, an indirect measure is needed to achieve 
testable propositions. In the fol!owing subsection, the internalization of processes leading to strategic 
resources accumulation is proposed to approximate the specific and opaque degree of firm's resources. 
THE INTERNALIZATION OF STRATEGIC INVESTMENT AS A MEASURE OF SPECIFIC 
AND/OR OPAQUE RESOURCES 
There is a wide range of reasons that lead economizing firms to choose to perform the activity in-house 
against alternative contract basis with another firm (Demsetz, 1988; Teece, 1988; Kogut and Zander, 
1992). Although perhaps the most influential perspective on vertical integration is comparative 
contracting. This approach analyzes how various governance structures, which differ in the costs with 
which they achieve adaptation between contracting parties, match with the characteristics of 
transactions. Adaptation is important because boundedly rationaI agents cannot foresee al! future 
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contingencies and contract against them. In this view, firms vertically integrate when transaction-
specific assets are suject to opportunistic expropriation by a buyer or supplier (Williamson, 1975, 
1985, 1991; Klein, Crawford and Alchian, 1978; Grossman and Hart, 1986). From the point of view of 
transaction cost economics, highly specific investments will be internally made to save the cost of an 
arm's length transaction. Because of its idiosyncratic application, a potential supplier of strategic 
resources ~-i.e. an independent lab or research organism, distributors, suppliers, employees, etc-- will 
be exposed to the opportunistic behavior of the buyer --the firrn-- and therefore specific investment and 
further transaction will be not undertaken, even though such exchanges would be profitable to both 
parties. Thus, it is reasonable to infer that internal accumulation of strategíc resources reflects higher 
levels of specific investment than subcontracted activities or external acquisition. Consequently, 
P3S: the internalízation level ofthe accumulation process of strategic resources ís 
posítively related to the degree of specificity of such resources. 
Other motivation of intemalization processes consistently explained by comparative contracting is the 
firm's attempt to prevent the exposure of proprietary knowledge to competitors (Teece, 1986). A 
profit-seeking innovator, confronted by knowledge valuable for its competitors and weak intellectual 
property protection, is forced to expand its activities through integration if it is to prevail over 
imitators. Agaín, internalizíng the sources ofthe 'key knowledge' can be a practice aimed at protecting 
'knowledge-based resources' against undesired disclosure: 
P3°: The internalization level of the accumulation process of strategic resources is positively 
related to the degree of opacity of such resources. 
Notice that this proposition holds for any kind of 'outsiders' --including buyers, employees, investors, 
subcontractors, etc-- and not only for suppliers. Any kind of firm-related inforrnation which could be 
valuable to its competitors must be kept away from outsiders. Otherwise the value of identifiable 
resources is threatened by potential arrangements between such external agents and competítors. Thus, 
the integration of activities related to the accumulation and deployment of strategic resources can be 
interpreted as a result of a decision process guided by the specific and opaque features of investments -
-Figure 4--. 
INSERT FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE 
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So far, we have described the advantages of internalization as a mechanism for dealing with the 
strategic dimensions of resources. Obviously, the development of new activities entails costs and 
restrictions that should be considered for a more comprehensive approach to the 'make-or-buy' 
decisions. 'An effective production of specific resources requires a 'critical mass' which is ofien 
resulting from a long and continuous stream of investments with higly uncertain results (Dierickx and 
Cool, 1989). Secrecy can only be a partial and temporary defense against competitors' efforts to be 
knowledgeable about the sources of higher returns. In addition, impeding information flows can be 
costly when internal agents --researchers, engineers or managers-- can behave opportunistically and, 
therefore, they must incentivated by means of a higher remuneration or other non-pecuniary benefits. 
Furthermore, coordination, control and planning processes become more complex in an integrated 
firmo Finally, fully-integrated activities need large amounts of financing for acquiring equipment, 
training personnel and investing in complementary assets. 
METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
We have tested our resulting propositions usmg panel data techniques (Hsiao, 1988). This 
methodology provides consistent estimates of coefficients when unobservable individual effects exist. 
In such cases, cross sectional OLS estimates using pooled data are biased and panel methods including 
individual effects must be considered to achieve consistency. The individual effects can be considered 
fixed or random, and their specifications are as follows: 
Fixed Effects Model, (FE) Random Effects Model, (RE) 
Yi, = a i + ~ Xii + ull 
where Yit and Xii are the dependent variable and independent variable, respectively. Individual effects 
are ai fixed, and 8, random and normally distributed. Finally, Uit is the random disturbance. 
Whether to treat the effects as tixed or random is not an easy question to answer and depends on the 
nature ofthe sample and the research objectives. The fixed-effects model is viewed as one in whjch the 
researcher makes inferences on the effects that are in the sample. The random-effects model is viewed 
as one in which investigators make unconditional inferences with respect to a larger population. 
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Obviously, that question is important when the estimates differ widely between the two models. The 
significance of such a difference is testable through the Haussman "/ test. 
The advantages of market-based measures over their accounting counterparts in approximating the real 
economic value of the firm has been extensively debated (Fisher and McGowan, 1983). Among the 
several reasons which justify the differences between the value of the firrn reflected in stock market 
values and the historical value reported in accounting financial statements, a major one is that financial 
statements are limited to those items that meet the present-day recognition criteria employed by the 
accounting profession. Thus, potentially relevant items such as advertising and R&D are not reported 
on balance sheets because they do not meet the qualitative criterion of reliability. Indeed, in Statement 
01Financial Accounting Standards No. 2, the FASB took the position that practically all R&D should 
be expensed as incurred 10. However, sorne authors justify the use of accounting measures with two 
basic reasons: (l) Financial statements are easier to access than market-based measures and their 
magnitudes are built under sorne homogeneous --accounting-- criteria and (2) the decisions of financial 
managers and investors are ofien based on information provided by book values. In order to provide 
more complete evidence, we have considered as an independent variable the financial leverage 
computed from accounting and market-based magnitudes. 
The Spanish stock market --Bolsa de Madrid-- is characterized by an unequal distribution of firrns by 
industries, where financial intermediaries --banking and insurance firms-- have a clear predominance. 
We excluded from our sample financial firms given the peculiarity of their activity. We started from 
119 non-financial firms quoted in the Spanish stock market, from 1990 to 1994. The accounting data of 
sales, total assets, debt and equity in books were extracted from the annual reports sent to the 
'Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores' --CNMV, analogous to the U.S. S.E.C.-- by the quoted 
firms. The market value of equity was computed from data collected in the annual'Boletín de 
Cotizaciones,11. Unfortunately, the information contained in the annual reports of quoted firrns does 
not include data on R&D, advertising and human resources so we addressed a postal survey --with 
succesive phone recalls-- to these 119 firms to gather additional data. The following raw data on 
expenses were requested: (1) total expenses per year of R&D intemally developed, (2) total expenses 
per year ofR&D extemally bought or subcontracted, (3) total expenses in advertising per year, and (4) 
total expenses in personal training. We also asked data on the structure and qualification of the firrn's 
10 A similar solution is adopted by the Spanish accounting standards (rule numo 5 of the Spanish 'Plan 
General Contable' of 1990.). 
1I In English terms, Bulletin of Quotations. 
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human resources: (1) the classification of employees by functional areas --CEO members and top 
executives; clerical staff, professional and technical staff; sales force and sellers-- and (2) the 
educational level of human resources --bachelors, engineers and architects; medium-college degree; 
specialized and unspecialized blue collar workers--. 
The aboye data were used to proxy the technological capabilities, reputational assets and specific 
human capital. These resources and capabilities have been traditionally considered as strategic due to 
their ability to generate aboye-normal rents and their imperfect imitability ami/or substitutability as a 
result of the market imperfections involved. 
We received a total number of 58 questionnaires and excluded those with bne or more empty fields and 
those whose answers on assets, sales and number of employees differed more than 10% from the data 
reported to the CNMV. After considering the aboye criteria, the size of our final sample was 185 
observations of 37 non-financial firms quoted in the Spanish stock market from 1990 to 1994. 
The following variables were constructed using the raw data: 
Financialleverage (LEVB; LEVM): We have considered two traditional measures of financialleverage. 
LEVB is the ratio of the book value of total debt with explicit cost --long-term and short-term debt-- to 
the book value of total debt plus the book value of total equity (Titman and Wessels, 1988). LEVM is 
the analogous ratio when using the market value oftotal equity (Balakrishnan and Fox, 1993). 
Specific and/or opaque R&D intensitv (lR&D): Previous works have used the ratio of R&D to net sales 
as proxy for intangible assets which are assumed to be more specific than tangible assets (Balakrishnan 
and Fox, 1993; Bradley, Jarrell and Kim, 1984; Titman and Wessels, 1988). The negative relationship 
between R&D intensity and the firm' s debt position is a broadly accepted regularity (Baysinger and 
Hoskisson, 1989; Hoskisson, Johnson and Moesel, 1994). In order to test propositions PI and P2, we 
have approximated the specificity and opacity level of R&D investment by the ratio of intemally 
expended R&D to total sales. As we discussed aboye, technological knowledge acquired through 
intemally developed activities is likely to be highly firm-specific and opaque. This interpretation would 
imply that IR&D will be robustly and negatively related to the firm's debt ratio. 
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Non-specific and/or transparent R&D íntensíty (ER&D): This ratio is analogous to ER&D when using 
external R&D expenditures. This category includes R&D acquired by contracting with other parties: 
firms, universities or research centers. According to our previous argument, such investments are less 
specific anci/or more transparent due to outsiders' collaboration. Therefore, a more moderated effect on 
leverage is expected. 
Advertísíng intensity (ADV):, The ratio of advertising expenses to net sales, as well as R&D intensity, 
has been used as a proxy for firm-specific assets (Titman and Wessels, 1988; Bradley, Jarrell and Kim, 
1984). This interpretation justifies a negative effect of this variable on financial leverage but, as 
Balalaishnan and Fox (1993) point out, this investment may represent the reputational assets of the 
firm as its purpose consists of transmitting information about the firm and its products to current and 
potential customers. Hence, advertising expenses should be considered a transparent investment which 
could facilitate the firm's access to external funding. Therefore, the effect of the advertising ratio will 
depend on the dominant effect --specificity vs. transparency-- over the debt ratio. 
Intangible assets ratio (INT) over total net assets: It is expected that most of the items included in the 
'Intangible assets' account l2 suffer greater losses ofvalue compared to tangible assets. In consequence, 
leverage should be negatively related to the proportion of intangible assets in books. Nevertheless, this 
measure has been largely criticized for its inability to capture both the accurate value of such assets as 
well as their specific component (Williamson, 1988). 
Specific human resources (SHC): The financial structure cannot only be affected by specific 
dimension of assets owned by the firmo As Titman (1984) states, if a certain worker or supplier needs 
to make specific investments, her collaboration will be more sensitive to the firm's bankruptcy 
probability and, hence, the financial leverage will be negatively related to the specificity level of such a 
collaborator's investment. Among the several measures useful for proxying human specific capital, 
employee turnover and tenure have been often used. Tenure was discarded because we needed an 
aggregate measure of human capital per firmo We also assumed that the answer rate would be lowered 
if turnover was requested as it would force those surveyed spend time computing such measure from 
their raw data base. Hence, we considered a suitable alternative to request data easily available to the 
human resource managers and , then computing an aggregate measure of human specific capital by 
factor analysis techniques. The specific human capital proxy is represented by a factor positively 
17 
• 
, 
: 
I 
correlated with the proportion of personnel with college studies (COLL), technical staff (TECH), and 
training expenses per employee (TRE). This factor shows negative correlations with the proportion of 
clerical staff (CLER) and the proportion of temporary (TEMP) over total number of employees --table 
1--. 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
Size and Industry CLSAL; SEC): Both control variables have been extensively used in the empirical 
analysis of the financial structure. A number of authors have suggested that leverage ratios may be 
related to firm size. Sorne evidence supports that direct bankruptcy costs appear to constitute a 1arger 
proportion of a firm's value as that value decreases (Wamer, 1977; Ang, Chua and MacConnell, 1982). 
We use the naturallogarithm of sales (LSAL) as the indicator of size. Previous literature indicates that 
firms within an industry are more similar than those in different industries --for a detailed discussion 
see Harris and Raviv, 1991--. We control the industry effects by their corresponding dummy variables 
(SE l-SES) 13. 
RESULTS 
To provide a reference point for subsequent estimates, we began by ignoring potential biases and 
estimating the equations by OLS. In addition, this specification allowedus to test the re1evance oftime, 
industry, and unobservable individual effects. These results are presented in the first two columns of 
Table 2. 
As far as industry effects are concerned, the 'Electric Utilities' group shows a significantiy higher 
leverage than the omitted sector --'Food'--. Conversely, the 'Machinery, Chemical and Mining' group 
is, on average, less leveraged. No significant time effects were detected. As the F-test shows --third and 
fourth columns--, the null hypothesis of equal intercepts across firms was rejected at 1% leve!. This 
result suggests potential biases in cross-sectional estimates and a more accurate estimation when using 
individual effects models. 
12 In Spanish terms, 'Inmovilizado inmaterial', reflects the part of expenditures in intangible assets that 
can be considered as an asset. 
13 After aggregating those sectors including less than four firms, we obtained the following sectors: 
SEC 1: Electric and Gas Utilities (SEC 1), Machinery, Chemical and Mining (SEC2), Food (SEC3), 
Construction and Highways (SEC4), and Manufacturing (SECS). 
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INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
Regardless of the individual effect model considered --fixed or random--, internal R&D investments 
over sales (IR&D) showed negative and significant effects on financial leverage. This effect remained 
significant' for both measures of financial leverage --LEVB and LEVM-- and support the empirical 
findings of previous works (Bradley, Jarrell and Kim, 1984; Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1989; 
Balakrishnan and Fox, 1993; Hoskisson, Johnson and Moesel, 1994) . In contrast, external R&D 
(ER&D) had no significant effect on the borrowing ratio. It is noteworthy that the robustness of this 
link is weakened when considering other proxies for strategic resources such as the advertising ratio 
(ADV) imd the specific human capital index (SHCI). A potential explanation of such a fact is that the 
market value of debt ratio may overcome the shortcomings of accounting measures in approximating 
the economic value of equity. This would also justify the poorer performance --adjusted R2-- of those 
models including the book value ofthe debt ratio as a dependent variable. 
The factor used as a proxy of specific human capital (SHCI) is negatively related to the financial 
leverage but only when market value of equity was considered. As we described aboye, this divergence 
of significance between the accounting and market-based measures of leverage may reflect that this 
factor increases the market value ofthe firm without affecting its book values. Positive and significant 
effects of advertising intensity were observed. This evidence corroborates previous findings 
(Balakrishnan and Fox, 1993) and sUPPOrtS the hypothesis that advertising intensity is a 'transparent' 
strategic resource as it convey valuable information about the firm and its products to current and 
potential customers as well as lenders and financial suppliers. 
In those models with the market measure of leverage as dependent variable, signifficant differences 
between the estimates from the fixed and the random effects models --Haussman "1: test-- are also 
found. Although signs and significance are consistent in both models, the random effects specification 
provides more moderated effects of internal R&D and advertising on the financial leverage, while the 
specific human resources index (SHCI) shows a greater impact --although lower significance--. This 
can be due to the different nature and statistic properties of the specific capital human index and the 
remaining proxies for strategic resources. Actually the factor used to proxy the specific human 
resources shows lower cross-sectional and longitudinal variability than the IR&D and advertising 
ratios. This fact would justify a higher correlation between SHCI and the unobserved individual effects 
and, consequently, negative bias is expected in the model estimates (Huselid and Becker, 1996). 
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As we previously stated, the choice of fixed vs. random effects specification depends more on the 
underlying hypothesis and scope of the research rather than the information provided by the data. 
When the aim of the analysis is to make inferences about a population based on a smaller sample, the 
random effect model is more efficient than the fixed effects one and, thus, a better choice. 
Nevertheless, the random effects model assumes that the individual effects are not correlated to errors, 
otherwise estimates become biased. Under such consideration, the rejection of the null hypothesis of 
the Haussman test lends support to the fixed effects model against the random effects specification in 
those models including the market value ofthe financialleverage as dependent variable. 
Other potential determinants are not significant in any estimation. These results indicate that the ratio 
of intangible to tangible fixed assets is not an accurate proxy for capturing the effects of specific fixed 
assets on financialleverage. The effect of size on capital structure is relatively weak and positive only 
in the random effects model --column 6-- . 
To test the robustness of the above results we repeated the estimation considering a larger subsample 
which includes all firms with, at least, two valid data on each item requested and replacing the missing 
values by the longitudinal average of the valid data in each incomplete item --see table 3--. This 
procedure allowed us to enlarge our sample by 75 observations --15 firms, 5 years-- to achieve a total 
of 260 observations --52 firms, 5 years--. 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
The resulting estimates are shown in table 4 and provide sorne differences compared to table 2. First, 
the etIects of strategic resources proxies over the market value of debt ratio not only remained the same 
but also became reinforced; second. the models including the book value of the borrowing ratio 
showed worse fit and significant negative effects of advertising intensity under the random effects 
model, although it was rejected against the fixed effects model by the Haussman test at 1% level. In 
essence this evidence supports the previous results obtained from the restricted subsample when of 
using the market value of the debt ratio as a dependent variable and backs up the critics of accounting 
measures as a limited representation of the economic value of equity and, consequently, the debt ratio 
computed from it. 
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INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
DISCUSSION 
Although the resource-view of the firm has contributed substantially to understanding the devices that 
maintain and enhance the competitive advantage, the underlying conceptual framework allows a more 
comprenhensive interpretation of heterogeneity in firms' behavior and outcomes. It is argued that the 
absence of imperfections in resource markets can set up effective barriers to defend the erosion of the 
firm's competitive position. Obviously, all of these obstacles to obtaining imperfectly imitable and 
substitutable resources and capabilities are valuable for the firm to the extent that its competitors have 
few, if any opportunities to acquire and deploy them. Therefore, imperfections in resource markets can 
also be viewed as restrictions to the feasible set of strategies for those firms lacking strategic resources. 
This 'dual perspective' ofthe resource-approach has straightforward implications not much explored in 
strategy research. Moreover, phenomena that restrict, at least during a long time period, the acquisition 
of valuable and difficult-to-copy resources not only states 'ex-ante' limits but also 'ex-post' conditions 
to the feasible corporate and business strategies. As a result, from a resource-based perspective the 
evaluation of strategic choices requires a deeper analysis than that derived from comparing traditional 
performance measures. 
In this research we have addressed this question by translating sorne kinds of market imperfections into 
terms of resource features. Specific assets entail sustainable rents as there exists a substantial 
difference between their productivity as a part of a particular firm and their market price or 
development cost. Opaque resources avoid imitation or substitution by competitors by assuming 
uncertain and complex processes or even by creating such uncertainty. Both dimensions add strategic 
content to resources and capabilities but also shape the financial policy ofthe firm and, in particular, its 
capital structure. Actually, the financial approach to these market imperfections prescribes higher risk 
and cost of financing and restricted availability of external funds when opaque resources are deployed. 
The results of our empirical study show that traditional proxies for strategic resources such as 
reputational assets, technological capabilities and specific human capital affect the firm's debt ratio in 
different ways in spite of the fact that they are expected to have similar implications as intangible 
assets and non-debt tax shields. Actually, essentially specific and opaque resources such as internally 
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made R&D and specific human capital are inversely linked to financial leverage. Alternatively, 
reputational assets, although specific, reveal a positive and robust correlation with the borrowing ratio 
consistently explained by their iníormational purpose. 
It is noteworthy that our theoretical scheme predicts that not only the nature and objective of 
investments but also their modes of acquisition can affect the capital structure of the firmo The 
evidence provided in this work confirms that financial structure is partially determined by 'make-or-
buy' decisions related to R&D activities. When specificity is the basic motivation for internalizing 
technological investments, debt cost will include a risk premium due to the higher losses ofvalue when 
financial distress occurs. If internal development of R&D attempts to preserve critical information, 
credit suppliers will restrict the volume of debt offered to the liquidation value of the firm's assets, in 
order to hedge their investment. As a result, internalization of R&D investments would be negatively 
related to the borrowing capacity of the firmo This hypothesis is supported by the resulting evidence of 
this research. The ratio of internal R&D investments to total net sales is significant and negatively 
correlated with the financial leverage, while external R&D intensity does not significantly affect the 
borrowing decision. 
These findings suggest interesting implications. First, firms exploiting resources with a high strategic 
content --highly opaque and specific-- face more restrictive financial scenarios. To the extent that 
equity is more expensive than debt --due to agency costs and tax effects-- resource-driven strategies 
can increase the cost of the firm's financial structure. Second, young and small firms lacking a critical 
mass of strategic resources will face serious limitations to growth as their financial choices are fewer 
than those for large and mature companies. Third, the design and implementation of a 'resource-based' 
strategy must be compatible with the financial policy of the firmo This implication is specially 
interesting when analyzing financially distressed firms. Fourth, the different effects of external and 
internal R&D on leverage justify a more disaggregated treatment of R&D investments. Otherwise, 
biased estimated effects of R&D may lead to different interpretations and inconclusive findings. Such 
an argument is supported by the recent empirical research that detects no significant or even positive 
relationships between R&D and access to financial markets (Hundley et al., 1996). Finally, sorne 
conclusions from a dynamic point of view. A firm characterized by a resource-driven strategy must 
take into account that the features of its strategic resource bundle will determine its future financial 
policy. The proposed bidimensional approach of strategic resources allows us to understand the 
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matching between the managerial processes of selection and implementation of business strategies and 
the feasible and desirable path of financial decisions. 
As concluding remarks we can anticipate sorne promising directions for future research derived from 
these results. From a theoretical point of view, opacityand specificity reduce borrowing capacity due to 
different causes. Opacity generates restrictions on the available amount of debt, while specificity 
increases the cost of debt financing. Unfortunately, our research design does not al10w us to distinguish 
between these distinctive effects. Further work about the impacts of the nature and features of strategic 
resources on other financial instruments --equity, convertible debt, long-tenn and short-term debt--
could help to clarify this issue. Obviously, the bidimensional approach described aboye is not 
exhaustive and other market imperfections such as complementarities or different kinds of 
informational asymmetries should be examined to complete this elementary approach to 
comprehending a firm's success in assuring the compatibility of its financial needs-availability of 
funds and the features of its targeted strategic bundle. 
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Tab1e l. Corre1ation matrix of the variables re1ated to the human resources and the 10ading factor of the 
specific human capital indexo 
COLL TRE TEMP COM TECH CLER SHCI(a) 
COLL 1 0.6453 
TRE 0.449** 1 0.7221 
TEMP -0.030 -0.276" 1 -0.3728 
COM -0.281 * -0.144 0.0199 1 0.1132 
TECH 0.573*** 0.274** -0.078 -0.293* 1 0.6154 
CLER 0.119 0.075 0.051 -0.123 -0.103 -0.5342 
Industry effects are eliminated by computing the correlation matrix over the differences of each variable and its industry 
mean. 
* Significance at 10% leve!. 
** Significancc at 5 % level 
*** Significance at 1 % level 
Ca) Extracted factor after 'varimax' rotation ofthe correlation matrix. Cronbach's a is 0.62. 
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Table 2. Resulting Estimates from the subsample including the complete questionnaires (37). Total 
number of observations, 37 firms x 5 years = 185 obs. 
Pooled data Fixed effects Random effects 
LEVM LEVB LEVM LEVB LEVM LEVB 
CONS. 0.38"""· 0.56·""" 
(5.37) (3.13) 
SHCI -11.17* -16.51 - 8.76** -11.31 -12.76* -9.22 
(-1.69) (-0.93) (-2.14) (-1.03) (-1.73) (-0.44) 
ADV 0.188*** 0.117* 0.092*** 0.036* 0.083*** 0.0794* 
(3.27) (1.71) (2.73) (1.81) (3.26) (1.66) 
IR+D -0.155*** -0.224*** -0.152*** -0.081*** - 0.112*** -0.121 *** 
(-5.54) (-6.62) (-4.78) (-5.76) (- 5.04) (-5.87) 
ER+D -0.2371 0.1162 0.083 0.1428 -0.1087 -0.0935 
(-0.84) (1.21 ) (1.43) (1.21 ) (-0.06) (-0.54) 
INM 0.1817 - 0.094 0.1302 -0.0744 -0.0552 0.0931 
(0.78) (-0.57) (0.61) (- 0.23) (-0.34) (0.97) 
LSAL 0.0987 0.1103 0.0577 0.1024 0.0377 0.0802* 
(1.26) (1.42) (1.33) (1.51 ) (0.95) (1.92) 
SEC1 0.207* 0.293** 
(1.71) (2.31 ) 
SEC2 -0.099* -0.135 
(-1.90) (-1.59) 
SEC4 0.0877 0.1051 
(0.77) (0.81) 
SEC5 0.0114 0.1373 
(0.26) (0.84) 
093 0.025 0.007 
(1.08) (0.64) 
092 0.002 0.004 
(0.42) (0.54) 
D91 - 0.035 -0.049 
(-0.84) (-1.21) 
090 - 0.026 -0.071 
(-0.17) (-0.91) 
R2 ad'J. 0.41 0.34 0.51 0.28 0.44 0.21 
X2 -test 10.71""" 6.02 
F-test 13.27"""· 8.07"""· (b)31.76"""· (b)29.44·""" --
p-value between parentheses 
SHCI: Specific human capital indexo 
(b) F statistic of egual intercepts (nul\ hypothesis: írrelevance of individual effects). 
X2 : Haussman test (null hypothesis: egual coefficients between the fixed and the random effects model). 
• Significance at 10 % level. 
""" Significance at 5 % leve! 
.""" Significance at 1% level 
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1 
1 
Table 3. Number of complete, incomplete and rejec-
ted questionnaires. 
Questionnaires with all data completed ,3 7 
Questionnaires with 3 or less missing values in 
advertising investments ,3 
R&O intemally developed 4 
R&O extemalIy acquired 6 
data on human resources structure 2 
Questionnaires rejected 6 
TOTAL 58 
30 
Table 4. Resulting Estimates from the subsample including the questionnaires with 3 or less missing 
values (52). Total number of observations, 52 firms x 5 years =185 obs. 
Pooled data Fixed effects Random effects 
LEVM LEVB LEVM LEVB LEVM LEVB 
CONS. 0.28*** 0.426*** -- -- -- --
(6.31 ) (5.12) -- -- -- --
SHCI -13.49** 3.63 -13.44*** -6.03 -18.73* 1.19 
(-1.82) (0.08) (-2.82) (-1.39) (-1.88) (0.14) 
ADV 0.113** 0.143 0.132* 0.098 0.143** -0.126* 
( 1.92) (1.58) (1.97) (1.04) (2.36) (-1.86) 
IR+D -0.414*** -0.301** -0.836*** -0.502*** -0.318*** -0.630** 
(-7.32) (-2.41) (-5.21) (-3.36) (-5.44) (-2.91) 
ER+D -0.537 -0.922 0.070 -0.479 0.127 -0.362* 
(-0.86) (-0.37) (0.64) (-0.94) (0.81) (-0.07) 
INM -2.45 0.758 -1.19 0.815 -0.133 -0.926 
(-0.75) (0.84) (-0.13) (0.24) (-0.72) (-1.19) 
LSAL 0.113 0.417* -0.054 0.212* -0.912 -0.136 
(1.01) (1.86) (-0.71) (1.80) (-0.43) (-1.45) 
SECl 0.384** 0.536* -- -- -- --
(1.89) (1.92) -- -- -- --
SEC2 -0.107* 0.058 -- -- -- --
(-1.69) (0.42) -- -- -- --
SEC4 1.75 -0.048 -- -- -- --
(1.27) (-0.16) -- -- -- --
SEC5 -0.204* -0.362** -- -- -- --
(-1.78) (-1.94) 
-- -- -- --
093 0.082 0.113 -- -- -- --
(0.76) (0.81) -- -- -- --
092 -0.044 0.169 -- -- -- --
(-0.31) (0.74) -- -- -- --
D91 0.226 -0.176 -- -- -- --
(0.135) (-0.52) -- -- -- --
090 0.114 -0.585 -- -- -- --
(0.79) (-1.31) 
-- -- -- --
adj. R2 0.38 0.25 0.57 0.33 0.47 0.16 
X2 -- -- -- -- 22.63"· 18.78"· 
F stat. (b)41.12"· (b)27.55"· -- --
p-value between parentheses 
SHCI: Specific human capital indexo 
(b) F statistic of equal intercepts (null hypothesis: irrelevance of individual effects). 
X2 : Haussman test (nul1 hypothesis: equal coefticients between the fixed and the random effects model). 
• Significance at 10% leve!. 
.. Significance at 5 % level 
... Significance at 1% level 
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Figure 1. The specific dimension oC an investment project and financial risk. 
Competitive 
Pressure 
Identifiable D 
LowWell-de'fined Resourceproperty rights Rents 
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Competitive 
Pressure 
Figure 2. The Iimited ability oC normal resources to generate and sustain rents. 
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(+) 
rlOEBTCOST 
ISPECIFICITY 1---·~(+) (-) 
(_) \V 
IINTERNALlZATION -->~I DEBT RArlO 
/1\ 
I-OP-A-CI-TY-----t (+) (-) 
"'" BORROWINGI-----7~ CAPACITY 
(-) 
Figure 3. Interaction scheme of strategic features of resources and its financial implications. 
START 
-J, 
yes 
~TERNALlZE:::> 
yes 
~no 
Figure 4. The specific and opaque dimension of resources and the 'make-or-buy' decision. 
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QUESTIONNAIRE 
Company's name: ACEITES Y PROTEINAS, S.A. 
The aggregate treatment of completed filled data assures their confidentiality. In order to facilitate the 
answers to the questionnarie, we provide sorne accounting infonnation which will be useful for 
identifying the productive unit. This information has been obtained from the finn's annual reports 
addressed to the 'Comision Nacional del Mercado de Valores'. If there are any mistakes, write over the 
incorrect data and rewrite the correct data in the squares below. 
1994 1993 1992 1991 1990 
Total net Sales 48310 49716 40801 13712 18123 
(in millo ofpesetas) 
I J 
Net Assets 19308 24410 19700 14808 11495 
(in mill. ofpesetas) 
I 
Average number 354 332 375 162 217 
ofworkers 
I. ADVERTISING EXPENDITURES 
1994 1993 1992 1991 1990 
1.1 Oid the finn carry out 
advertising activities in the 
years 1990-94? (yes/no).. 
1.2 Total advertising ex-
penditures (account 627 of 
POC) in mill. of ptas..... 
11. I+D EXPENDITURES 
1994 1993 199219911990 
11.1 Oid the finn make or contract R&O 
activities in the years 1990-94? 1---"""---"""---
(yes/no) . -1 
11.2 Total expenditures in R&D in mill. of pesetasl in percentage over net sales (write over what does 
not apply): 
1994 1993 1992 1991 1990 
-made by the firm ________+-- !..;;.;...;....-""'T"'-------, 
-contracted with other parties 
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III. Structure and trainning of employees 
m.1 Write the average permanent employees under the following classifications, number of average 
individuals / in percentage over total employees (write over what does not apply) 
1994 1993 1992 1991 1990 
~Bachelor, Engineers and 
Architects 
-Medium undergraduate studies 
-Specialized workers 
-Unspecialized workers 
-Other 
1994 1993 1992 1991 1990 
-Top executives and CEOs 
-Professional and technical staff 
-Clerical staff 
-Sales force 
-Remaining permanent employees 
Temporary employees 
m.2 Did the firm hire temporary personnel in the years 1990-1994? (answer yes or no) 
1994 1993 1992 1991 1990 
-Number oftemporary workers I I I I 1-----, 
-Number ofaverage weeks per worker __--.1 
Personnel training 
m.3. Did the firm carry out training activ-1994 1993 1992 1991 1990 
I Iities during the years 1990-94?(yeslno) I I I I 
-developed by the firm 
-developed by other parties 
m.5. Total expenditures in training of employees. In millions ofpesetas / in percentage 
over total salaries. I I I I 1__.....1 
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